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.High Court of Justice. Queen's Bench Division.
GODDARD v. O'BRIEN.
Payment of a check for 1001. payable on demand and duly honored, given and
accepted in settlement of a debt of 1251., is a good accord and satisfaction as to the
whole debt.
Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. 426, commented on.
Tim was a special case stated by Mr. STONOR, Judge of the
Southwark county court, as follows:
The plaintiffs are billiard and bagatelle slate manufacturers, of
Vine street, York Road, S. W., and the defendant is a billiard
table maker carrying on business -at Manchester.
The action is brought to recover the sum of 421. 2s. 9d. for goods
sold and delivered, made up as follows: 251. 7s. 9d., balance of
account for goods sold and delivered between the 6th-of May 1879,
and the 26th of April 1880; 5s., extra charge on delivery of
goods already paid for; and the balance of 181. 10s., for goods
manufactured by the plaintiffs for the defendant in the year 1881.
I found for the defendant in respect of the second and third
items of claim for 5s. and 181. 10s. respectively, and the plaintiffs
are not desirous of appealing from my judgment in respect of either
of these two amounts.
On the 16th of August 1880, the defendant was indebted to the
plaintiffs in the sum of 1251. 7s. 9d. for slates for billiard tables
sold and delivered by them to him, which sum was then due and
payable. On that day Mr. Newill, a member of the plaintiffs' firm,
met the defendant, and agreed to accept the sum of 1001. in dis-
charge of the said sum of 1251. 7s. 9d. The defendant thereupon
gave to the plaintiffs a check for 1001., payable on demand, and
the plaintiffs gave him a receipt in the following form
"Received the sum of 1001. by check, which is to be in settle-
ment of an account of 1251. 7s. 9d. on said check being honored.
August 16th 1880. GODDARD & SON."
The check was duly honored. There was no consideration given
by the defendant or received by the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the
said sum of 1251. 7s. 9d., other than the said check for 1001.
This action was tried before me on the 2d of December 1881, and
I gave judgment on the 12th of January 1882,-for the defendant,
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and held that the payment to and acceptance by the plaintiffs of
the check for 1001. in settlement of their claim of 1251. 7s. 9d. was
a good accord and satisfaction by reason of the check being a ne-
gotiable security, although the payment of 1001. in cash would not
have been a good accord and satisfaction.
The plaintiffs allege that they were induced to agree to accept
the sum of 1001. in discharge of their debt of 1251. 7s. 9d. by cer-
tain representations made to them by the defendant, which subse-
quently proved to be 14lse, but I found that no such representations
had been made.
The questions submitted for the opinion of the court are:-
1. Whether the payment by the defendant to the plaintiffs of the
check for 1001. in settlement of the debt of 1251. 7s. 9d. was a
good accord, and satisfaction of the whole of the plaintiffs' debt.
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for the said
sum of 1251. 7s. 9d.
Broun, for the appellants.-The question is whether a payment
by a check for 1001. is good accord and satisfaction for a debt of
1251. and I rely on Cumber v. Wane, I Str. 426, 1 Sm. Lead.
Cas., 7th ed., p. 591.
Woodward, for the respondent, was not called upon.
Gnov. J.-I am cf opinion that the county court judge was
right in his decision. No doubt the difficulty in this and similar
cases arises from the decision in C(umber v. Wane, which is entitled
to all respect, although we may not perceive the reasoning on which
the decision is founded. Cumber v. Wane has, however, been much
qualified by the case of Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23, and the
only way in which Cumber v. Wane appears to have been kept
alive is by the court saying that it did not appear in that case that
-the note was a negotiable one. In the present case the payment
was by a check which is a negotiable instrument, and Sibree v.
Tripp is a direct authority for saying that a negotiable security
may operate, if so given and taken, in satisfaction of a debt of a
greater amount.
I admit I cannot follow the reasoning of Cumber v. Wane, or
why the argument that applies to negotiable instruments should not
.equally apply to money.
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HUDDLESTON, B.-I am of the same opinion, and on the grounds
on which the county court judge has decided, viz., that this pay-
ment was a good accord and satisfaction by reason of the check
being a, negotiable instrument.
The doctrine of Cumber v. Wane is, no doubt, very much quali-
fied by Sibree v. Tripp, and I cannot find that better stated than
in 1 Sm. Lead. Cas., 7th ed.., p. 595: "The general doctrine in
Ctzber v. Wane, and the reason of all the exceptions and distinc-
tions which have been engrafted upon it may, perhaps, be summed
up as follows, viz., that a creditor cannot bind himself by a simple
agreement to accept h smaller sum in lieu of an ascertained debt
of larger a-mount, such an agreement being nudzum pactum, but
if there be any benefit, or even legal possibility of benefit, to the
creditor thrown in, that additional weight will turn the scale, and
render the consideration sufficient to support the agreement."
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Few legal propositions strike a busi-
ness man with more surprise than this,
that a creditor is not bound by his fair
and explicit agreement to accept part of
his debt in full satisfaction of the whole,
and that he may, notwithstanding such
agreement, and its prompt and faithful
fulfilment by the debtor, immediately
upon its receipt, sue for and recover the
balance of his original debt. But this is
only the logical and necessary result of
the elementary doctrine that every con-
tract requires a legal consideration to
support it; and that the receipt of what
one is already legally entitled to is not
such a gain, nor the payment of what one
is already fully bound to pay such a loss,
as to form a sufficient consideration for
any promise or undertaking by a creditor
to his debtor.
The doctrine is said to have been
derived from the civil law, but was early
adopted in the common law, for, in 1602,
is was solemnly resolved in Pinnel's Case,
5, Co. R. 117, a, "that payment of a
lesser sum on the day in satisfaction
of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction
for the whole : and when the whole sum
is dne, by no initendment the acceptance
of parcel can be a satisfaction to the
plaintiff." And the line of authority
from that day to this is unbroken, when
all the requisite conditions concur.
But the rule itself is so technical, its op-
eration so harsh and apparently so unjust,
that courts have ever been ready to con-
fine it within its strictest limits, and have
seized upon every opportunity to refuse
its application. And in the light of mod-
ern decisions, it cannot safely be stated
to extend beyond this, " that part pay-
ment of a liquidated or undisputed ac-
count, made by a debtor to his creditor
in money, at the tiros when, and place
where the whole is then payable, not
made by way of a joint composition with
creditors, is not a legal consideration for
the creditor's express but unsealed pro-
mise to waive or postpone payment of
the balance, and he may immediately
sue and recover the rest, notwithstand-
ing a receipt is given in full of all
demands."'
This conclusion therefore does not fol-
low, unless upon the exact premises above
stated. The rule does not apply therefore,
1. Where the claim is unliquidated or
disputed. If it be a doubtful claim, or
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even bona fide disputed, though not in
one sense really doubtful ; or if it be
unliquidated, as a claim in tort where
the damages are wholly uncertain, pay-
ment of any sum given and received in
full satisfaction, is a bar to a suit for
any more, however strong the proof
might be that the whole was justly due ;
Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met. 551 ; O'Donohue
v. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 148; AlcDaniels
v. Lapham, 21 Vt. 222; Palmerton v.
Huxford, 4 Denio 166 ; Coon v. Knap,
4 Seld. 402; Pierce v. =ierce, 25 Barb.
243; Powell v. Jones, 44 Id. 521 ; Bull
v. Bull, 43 Conn. 455 ; United States v.
Child, 12 Wall. 232, and many other
cases.
2. The question usually arises upon
the part payment of an account, or open
claim; but the rule seems to apply
equally to part payment of a bond or
note; and the balance of the note, if
unsurrender'd and uncarcelled, may be
recovered notwithstanding an endorse-
ment upon it of the receipt of part there-
.of in full: Pearson v. Thomason, 15
Ala. 700. And see jlfordcai v. Stewart,
36 Geo. 126.
If, however, the note be surrendered
or cancelled, the whole claim is dis-
charged, and no action can afterwards
be maintained upon such instrument for
the unpaid balance: .K'ent v. Reynolds,
8 Hun 559 ; Ellsworth v, Fogg, 35 Vt.
355 ; Draper v. Hitt, 43 Id. 439:
Beach v. Endress, 51 Barb. 570; Silvers
v. Reynolds, 22 N. J. 275.
And the same result would follow upon
a mere surrender or cancellation of a
note with intent to discharge it, even
without a partial payment upon it; Van-
derbeck v. Vanderbeck, 30 N. J. Eq.
265 ; Booth v. Smith, 3 Woods 19.
This is giving much more effect to a
surrender of a note than the delivery of
the bill or account, with a receipt in full
attached ; for it is well settled that even
such a receipt does not bar a recovery for
the balance of the account : nitch v. Sut-
ton, 5 East 230 ; Harrsnaa v. Harriman,
12 Gray 341; Ryan v. Ward, 48 N.Y
204; Hendrickson v. Beers, 6 Bosw. 639.
3. A partial phyment, to be an ineffect-
ual extinguishment of a larger debt, must
have been made by the debtor himself.
If made by another from his own money,
it is operative, though done at the debt-
or's instance and request. Therefore,
while if a debtor borrows the money of a
friend and positively pays the debt, the
whole is not discharged, yet if lie pro-
cures the same friend to go and pay the
same amount in person, the creditor is
bound by his agreement to accept it in
fall satisfaction. This certainly seems
like forsaking the substance, and cling-
ing to the shadow, but ita lex scripta est.
And this rule applies to notes, checks or
indorsements ofthird persons, accepted in
payment, as well as to present payment in
money: Steinman v. .Jlagnus, 11 East 390;
Lewis v. .ones, 4 B. & C. 506 ; Boyd .v.
Hitchcock, 20 Johns. 76 ; Brooks v. Vhite,
2 Met. 283; Kellogg v.Richards, 14Wend.
116 ; Smithv. Ballou, 1 R. 1.496; Col-
burn v. Gould, I N. H. 279 ; Guild v.But-
lcr, 127 Mass. 386; Lee v. Oppenheimer,
32 Me. 253, and numerous other cases.
Therefore if the debtor's wife pays
part of the debt, or gives her note and
mortgage to secure it, and in considera-
tion therefor the creditor discharges the
husband, this is valid and binding: Kee-
ler v. Salisbury, 33 N. Y. 648 ; Bowker
v. Harris, 30 Vt. 424.
And even one partner's private note
for half of a partnership debt, has been
thought a good consideration for the cred-
itor's agreement to discharge him from
the balance ; since thereby the creditor
acquires the right to look to the pHivatc
assets of such partner, paripassu with his
other private creditors, and this may be
such a new advantage as to come within
the rule of law : Ludington v. Bell. 77
N. Y. 138.
4. It is essential also that the part pay-
ment should be to the creditor himself, in
order to be unavailing. A partial payment
to another, though at the creditor's in-
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stance and request, is a good discharge of
the whole debt. The debtor in such case
has done something more than lie was
originally bound to do ; or at least some-
thing different; it may be more or it may
be less, as a matter of fact. His original
contract was to pay $100 to A. His
second was a payment of $50 tofB. Thus
where H. had a judgment claim against
G. for $1700 and agreed with G. that
if he would pay him $550, and $100 more
to his attorney, this should discharge the
whole judgment, and G. did so, .the
whole debt was held to be cancelled:
Harper v. Graham, 20 Ohio 106.
5. In Mone.-Part payment in pro-
perty, real or personal, personal services
or other thing given and received in full
payment, is ir full discharge, whatever the
value of the thing received. Coicn
states it thus (Co. Litt. sec. 344) : "If
the debtor pay the creditor a horse, a cup
of silver, a ring of gold, or any other
such thing, in full satisfaction of the
money, and the other receives it, this is
good enough, and as strong as if he had
received the sum of money ; though the
horse or other thing were not of the
twentieth part of the value of the sum
of money ; because the other bath ac-
cepted it in full satisfaciion." This is
perfectly well settled law, though therea-
son given by Ld. Costa may. not be en-
tirely satisfactory, for hal the payment
been in money, the creditor may have
" accepted it in full satisfaction," but
nevertheless it would not be such in law.
The result, however, is sustained by in-
numerable authorities, some of which are,
Watkinson v. Inglesby, 5 Johns. 386 ;
Blinn v . Chester, 5 Day 359 ; Gaffney v.
Chapman, 4 Roberts. 275 ; Rose v. Hall,
26 Conn. 392 ; Bull v. Bull, 43 Id. 455.
Therefore a bar of gold worth $100
will discharge a debt of $500; while
400 gold dollars in current coin will not.
And this brings us to the exact ques-
tion involved in Goddard v. O'Briem.
Will the debtor's own negotiable note or
check for part of his debt, given and
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actually received in full payment of the
entire claim, and duly paid at maturity,
operate in law as such ? If the original
claim were an accgunt, or an unnegotia-
ble claim, or note, it would seem on
principle there could be no doubt about
it. The debtor gives 'and the creditor
receives what was not originally con-
templated. The advantage, real or
supposed, of a negotiable note, for part
of an unnegotiable claim, is a suf-
ficient consideration in law for tie
creditor's agreement not to collect the
rest. And this result would seem to
follow whether the negotiable note be
actually paid or not at maturity, pro-
vided it was itself received as an accord
and satisfaction. For if an immediate
part payment in cash would not discharge
the debt, it is difficult to see how pay-
ment at some future day, when the new
note matures, could have that effect.
The doctrine in Goddard v. O'Brien,
had been already distinctly announced
and acted upon, by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in Mechanics' Bank v.
Husto, (Feb. 13th 1882), 11 Weekly
Notes Cases 389, in which the decided
advantage which a creditor acquires by
the receipt of a negotiable note for part
of his debt, a§ by the increased facility
of recovering upon it. the presumption of
a consideration for it, the ease of dis-
posing of it in market, &c., was held to
furnish ample reasons why it should be
a valid discharge of a larger account
or open claim unnegotiable.
The question still remains, will the
debtor's own unnegotiable note for part
of an account, if taken in discharge,
have that effect. When we remember
how slight a new advantage or benefit to
tie creditor, or how trifling a new and
additional burden, or loss incurred by
the debtor is sufficient, it would seem
that a written promise, over the debtor's
own signature, might be so much better
than an open account, or an unwritten
or implied promise, even for a larger
sum, as to satisfy this technical rule of
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law, and operate, if so agreed, as a com-
plete accord and satisfaction.
There certainly seems to be good
ground for holding that if as a matter
of fact, it be proved that the creditor
positively agreed to take a new security or
form of obligation in fill satisfaction of a
larger claim, that the old is extinguished.
If a barley corn received in payment
can discharge a money claim for $100,
why may not the debtor's note for $500
if really so agreed upon. If such par-
tial note be secured by a new mortgage
of the debtor's property, there is author-
ity for holding that it operates to extin-
guish the old debt: Warren v. Skinner,
20 Conn. 561, ELLSWOUTi, T. ; Plliam
v. Taylor, 50 Miss. 251. If so, and
the new note be unsecured, and so not
so valuable to the creditor, it is only a
difference in degree of benefit; in each
case the creditor acquires a new advan-
tage, and the law does not attempt to
measure the adequacy or sufficiency of
the benefit conferred. That the tendency
of modern decisions is to hold that a
new note for part of an open account is,
if so agreed, a valid discharge of the
old debt, see Babcock v. awkins, 23
Vt. 561 ; Jaffray v. Crane, 50 Wis.349.
It is true Cumber v. W17ane, 1 Str. 426,
is directly against it : hut it should be
remembered that the law on this subject
was not so well understood at that day
as at present, and in the light of the mod-
ern decisions the question may still be
considered an open one.
6. The next requisite for the applica-
tion of the rule is, that tie part payment
must be made at, or not before the time
the whole is due, and not at some different
place. For it is clear that a payment in
advance is, if agreed to, full satisfaction
for a larger claim not yet due ; Co.
Litt. 212 b. ; Brooks v. White, 2 Met.
283. Bowler v. Childs, 3 Allen 434;
Smith v. Brown, 3 Hawks 580..
In M1itchell v. Wheaton, 46 Conn.
315, this rte was'applied to a case
where one half the debt and the costs
of suit were agreed to be paid, while the
suit was pending, and therefore before
the claim for costs had become fully per-
fected by a judgment, for though the
principal debt was long overdue, the costs
were not, and might never become a
debt. So if the partial payment be
Made at some different place fiom that
of the original debt, this is such, or may
be such, an additional advantage or
convenience to the creditor as to make
his agreement binding; Harper v. Gra-
hem, 20 Ohio 105, 117; .Jones v. Perkins,
29 Miss. 140 ; Smith v. Brown, 3 Hawks
580; McKenzie v. Culbreth, 66 N. 0.
534; eidv. Hhibbard, 6 Wis. 175.
7. The last requisite for the rule is
that such partial payment must not have
been made by way of or As a part of a
joint scheme with all the creditors to
accept a percentage of their claims in full
discharge of the wholev For it is now
well agreed that if one's creditors sign a
joint instrument of discharge, agreeing
mutually to accept a part in lieu of the
whole, and the debtor agreeing thereto,
pays the stipulated amount, no such
creditor can afterwards collect the bal-
ance, even though the discharge of the
debtor be not under seal; Goody. Chees-
snan, 2 B. & Ad. 328 (1831) ; .Reay V.
White, 1 Cr. & M1. 748; 3 Tyr. 596;
Murray v. Snow, 37 Iowa 410: Daniels
v. Hatch, 1 Zab. 391; Ferrington v.
Rodgdon, 119 Mass. 453, and many
other cases.
In Steinman v. M1agnus, I 1 East 390,
Browne v. Stack-pole, 9 N. H. 478, and
many others cited in support of this doc-
trine, the d btor had also given the secur-
ity of some third person, forhispayment
of the composition, and, therefore, for
that reason alone, the compromise would
be binding.
This effect of a joint composition
has been said to rest, however, much,
if not' entirely, on the ground of the
mutual agreement between the cred-
itors, and not merely on the contract be-
tween debtor and creditor, and it is con-
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sidered unfair to the other creditors to
allow one to subsequently recover his
debt in full, when the others cannot.
And this has been carried so far, as not
to allow one creditor to recover on a note
subsequently given to him by the debtor
for the balance of his debt : Cocksholtt
v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763 ; Case v. Ger-
rish, 15 Pick. 50; Wriggin v. Bush, 12
Johns. 306.
And in England the creditor has been
even compelled to refund to the debtor a
payment actually made in excess of the
proportion agreed upon by all, and paid
to all the others : Atkinson v. Denby, 7
H. & N. 934; In re Lenzberg's Policy, 7
Ch. Div. 650.
But if the debtor has enough to pay
all the creditors in full, or gives his notes
to each for the balance due him, is there
any reason in law why this arrangement
should be invalid merely because it em-
braces all the creditors, when it clearly
would net be if it extended to only one,
and that one was all? It seems not.
Perhaps this modification of the rule orig-
inally rested upon the ground that the
debtor in the joint composition conveys
all his property, real and personal, to his
creditors, or to trustees for them, and
therefore, their agreement to accept part
would be binding, upon the principles be-
fore stated of accepting property instead
of money.
That the whole doctrine of composi-
tion rests upon peculiar grounds is evi-
dent from the fact that if all the credit-
ors separately agree with their debtor to
take a part in full, and do this unbe-
known to each other, and not induced
thereto by the action of the others, such
an arrangement is not a bar to a future
recovery of the balance, by each separate
creditor, though all had in fact agreed to
a similar deduction : Bliss v. Shwarts,
65 N. Y. 444 ; Sage v. V'alentine, 23
Minn. 102 ; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11 Vt.
60. And see Perkins v. Loclcood, 100
Mass. 249.
The course of decisions on this subject
fully illustrate how eager, it may be said,
courts are to discover some slight reasons
for evading the general rule, and hold-
ing the agreement binding on the cred-
itor, whenever the slightest additional
advantage to him, or loss to the debtor
can be discovered, Perhaps the rule has
been sometimes pushed too far. Thus
in Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Me. 362, it was
held that a creditor was bound by his
agreement to accept part in full payment,
on being informed that the debtor would
otherwise go into bankruptcy, and that
he would not probably receive so large
a dividend, as the composition offered.
But the insolvency of the debtor, his
inability to pay others an equal percent-
age, his pains and trouble in earning or
borrowing the money to pay his stipulated
sum, cannot be considered any additional
legal gain to the creditor or legal loss to
the debtor. The latter, in makimg his
payment has done only what he was
legally bound to do, and what the cred-
itor had a legal right to demand, and it
can make no legal difference whether
the debtor inherited the money, or pro-
cured it only by extraordinary exertions,
or self sacrifice. See Harriman v. Har-
riman, 12 Gray 341; Bunge v. Keop,
48 N. Y. 225; Pearson v. Thonason,
15 Ala. 700.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.
Boston.
